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Abstract
In this paper we present an interacting-agent model of speculative
activity explaining bubbles and crashes in stock markets. We describe
stock markets through an infinite-range Ising model to formulate the ten-
dency of traders getting influenced by the investment attitude of other
traders. Bubbles and crashes are understood and described qualitatively
and quantitatively in terms of the classical phase transitions. When the in-
teractions among traders become stronger and reach some critical values,
a second-order phase transition and critical behaviour can be observed,
and a bull market phase and a bear market phase appear. When the
system stays at the bull market phase, speculative bubbles occur in the
stock market. For a certain range of the external field that we shall call
the investment environment, multistability and hysteresis phenomena are
observed. When the investment environment reaches some critical values,
the rapid changes in the distribution of investment attitude are caused.
The first-order phase transition from a bull market phase to a bear market
phase is considered as a stock market crash.
Furthermore we estimate the parameters of the model using the ac-
tual financial data. As an example of large crashes we analyse Japan
crisis (the bubble and the subsequent crash in the Japanese stock market
in 1987-1992), and show that the good quality of the fits, as well as the
consistency of the values of the parameters are obtained from Japan cri-
sis. The results of the empirical study demonstrate that Japan crisis can
be explained quite naturally by the model that bubbles and crashes have
their origin in the collective crowd behaviour of many interacting agents.
keyword Speculative Bubbles; Stock market crash; Phase transition;
Mean field approximation; Japan crisis
1 Introduction
The booms and the market crashes in financial markets have been an object
of study in economics and a history of economy for a long time. Economists
[1], and Economic historians [2], [3], [4] have often suggested the importance
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of psychological factors and irrational factors in explaining historical financial
euphoria. As Keynes [1], a famous economist and outstandingly successful in-
vestor, acutely pointed out in his book, The General theory of Employment, In-
terest and Money, stock price changes have their origin in the collective crowd
behaviour of many interacting agents rather than fundamental values which
can be derived from careful analysis of present conditions and future prospects
of firms. In a recent paper published in the Economic Journal, Lux [5] mod-
elled the idea explicitly and proposed a new theoretical framework to explain
bubbles and subsequent crashes which links market crashes to the phase transi-
tions studied in statistical physics. In his model the emergence of bubbles and
crashes is formalised as a self-organising process of infections among heteroge-
neous traders 1. In recent independent works, several groups of physicists [7],
[8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17] proposed and demonstrated em-
pirically that large stock market crashes, such as the 1929 and the 1987 crashes,
are analogous to critical points. They have claimed that financial crashes can be
predicted using the idea of log-periodic oscillations or by other methods inspired
by the physics of critical phenomena 2. In this paper we present an interacting-
agent model of speculative activity explaining bubbles and crashes in stock
markets. We describe stock markets through an infinite-range Ising model to
formulate the tendency of traders getting influenced by the investment attitude
of other traders. Bubbles and crashes are understood and described qualita-
tively and quantitatively in terms of the classical phase transitions 3. Although
the interacting-agent hypothesis [21] is advocated as an alternative approach
to the efficient market hypothesis (or rational expectation hypothesis) [22], lit-
tle attention has been given to the point how probabilistic rules, that agents
switch their investment attitude, are connected with their decision-making or
their expectation formations. Our interacting-agent model follows the line of
Lux [5], but differs from his work in the respect that we model speculative activ-
ity here from a viewpoint of traders’ decision-making. The decision-making of
interacting-agents will be formalised by minimum energy principle, and the sta-
tionary probability distribution on traders’ investment attitudes will be derived.
Next, the stationary states of the system and speculative dynamics are anal-
ysed by using the mean field approximation. It is suggested that the mean field
approximation can be considered as a mathematical formularisation of Keynes’
beauty contest. There are three basic stationary states in the system: a bull
market equilibrium, a bear market equilibrium, and a fundamental equilibrium.
We show that the variation of parameters like the bandwagon effect or the in-
vestment environment, which corresponds to the external field, can change the
size of cluster of traders’ investment attitude or make the system jump to an-
other market phase. When the bandwagon effect reaches some critical value, a
second-order phase transition and critical behaviour can be observed. There is
a symmetry breaking at the fundamental equilibrium, and two stable equilibria,
the bull market equilibrium and bear market equilibrium appear. When the sys-
tem stays in the bull market equilibrium, speculative bubble occurs in the stock
market. For a certain range of the investment environment multistability and
1For a similar study see also Kaizoji [6].
2See also a critical review on this literature [18].
3A similar idea has been developed in the Cont-Bouchaud model with an Ising modification
[19] from another point of view. For a related study see also [20]. They study phase transitions
in the social Ising models of opinion formation.
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hysteresis phenomena are observed. When the investment environment reaches
some critical values, the rapid changes (the first-order phase transitions) in the
distribution of investment attitude are caused. The phase transition from a bull
market phase to a bear market phase is considered as a stock market crash.
Then, we estimate the parameters of the interacting-agent model using an
actual financial data. As an example of large crashes we will analyse the Japan
crisis (bubble and crash in Japanese stock market in 1987-1992). The estimated
equation attempts to explain Japan crisis over 6 year period 1987-1992, and
was constructed using monthly adjusted data for the first difference of TOPIX
and the investment environment which is defined below. Results of estimation
suggest that the traders in the Japanese stock market stayed the bull market
equilibria, so that the speculative bubbles were caused by the strong bandwagon
effect and betterment of the investment environment in 3 year period 1987-1989,
but a turn for the worse of the investment environment in 1990 gave cause to the
first-order phase transition from a bull market phase to a bear market phase.
We will demonstrate that the market-phase transition occurred in March 1990.
In Section 2 we construct the model. In Section 3 we investigate the relationship
between crashes and the phase transitions. We implement an empirical study
of Japan crisis in Section 4. We give some concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 An Interacting-Agent Model of Speculative
Activity
We think of the stock market that large numbers of traders participate in trad-
ing. The stock market consists of N traders (members of a trader group).
Traders are indexed by j = 1, 2, ........, N . We assume that each of them can
share one of two investment attitudes, buyer or seller, and buy or sell a fixed
amount of stock (q) in a period. xi denotes the investment attitude of trader i
at a period. The investment attitude xi is defined as follows: if trader i is the
buyer of the stock at a period, then xi = +1. If trader i, in contrast, is the
seller of the stock at a period, then xi = −1.
2.1 Decision-Making of traders
In the stock market the price changes are subject to the law of demand and
supply, that the price rises when there is excess demand, and the price falls
when there is excess supply. It seems natural to assume that the price raises if
the number of the buyer exceeds the number of the seller because there may be
excess demand, and the price falls if the number of seller exceeds the number
of the seller because there may be excess supply. Thus a trader, who expects
a certain exchange profit through trading, will predict every other traders’ be-
haviour, and will choose the same behaviour as the other traders’ behaviour as
thoroughly as possible he could. The decision-making of traders will be also in-
fluenced by changes of the firm’s fundamental value, which can be derived from
analysis of present conditions and future prospects of the firm, and the return
on the alternative asset (e.g. bonds). For simplicity of an empirical analysis we
will use the ratio of ordinary profits to total capital that is a typical measure
of investment, as a proxy for changes of the fundamental value, and the long-
term interest rate as a proxy for changes of the return on the alternative asset.
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Furthermore we define the investment environment as
investment environment = ratio of ordinary profits to total capital - long-
term interest rate.
When the investment environment increases (decreases) a trader may think
that now is the time for him to buy (sell) the stock. Formally let us assume
that the investment attitude of trader i is determined by minimisation of the
following disagreement function ei(x),
ei(x) = −
1
2
N∑
j=1
aijxixj − bisxi. (1)
where aij denotes the strength of trader j’s influence on trader i, and bi denotes
the strength of the reaction of trader i upon the change of the investment en-
vironment s which may be interpreted as an external field, and x denotes the
vector of investment attitude x = (x1, x2, ......xN ). The optimisation problem
that should be solved for every trader to achieve minimisation of their disagree-
ment functions ei(x) at the same time is formalised by
minE(x) = −
1
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
aijxixj −
N∑
i=1
bisxi. (2)
Now let us assume that trader’s decision making is subject to a probabilistic
rule. The summation over all possible configurations of agents’ investment at-
titude x = (x1, ....., xN ) is computationally explosive with size of the number
of trader N .Therefore under the circumstance that a large number of traders
participates into trading, a probabilistic setting may be one of best means to
analyse the collective behaviour of the many interacting traders. Let us intro-
duce a random variable xk = (xk1 , x
k
2 , ......, x
k
N ), k = 1, 2, .....,K. The state of the
agents’ investment attitude xk occur with probability P (xk) = Prob(xk) with
the requirement 0 < P (xk) < 1 and
∑K
k=1 P (x
k) = 1. We define the amount of
uncertainty before the occurrence of the state xk with probability P (xk) as the
logarithmic function: I(xk) = − logP (xk). Under these assumptions the above
optimisation problem is formalised by
min〈E(x)〉 =
N∑
k=1
P (xk)E(xk) (3)
subject to H = −
∑N
k=1 P (x
k) logP (xk),
∑N
k=−N P (x
k) = 1,
where E(xk) = 1
2
∑N
i=1Ei(x
k). xk is a state, and H is information entropy.
P (xk) is the relative frequency the occurrence of the state xk. The well-known
solutions of the above optimisation problem is
P (xk) =
1
Z
exp(−µE(xk)), Z =
K∑
k=1
exp(−µE(xk)) k = 1, 2, .....,K. (4)
where the parameter µ may be interested as a market temperature describing a
degree of randomness in the behaviour of traders . The probability distribution
P (xk) is called the Boltzmann distribution where P (xk) is the probability that
the traders’ investment attitude is in the state k with the function E(xk), and Z
is the partition function. We call the optimising behaviour of the traders with
interaction among the other traders a relative expectation formation.
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2.2 The volume of investment
The trading volume should depends upon the investment attitudes of all traders.
Since traders are supposed to either buy or sell a fixed amount of stock (q) in a
period, the aggregate excess demand for stock at a period is given by q
∑N
i=1 xi.
2.3 The price adjustment processes
We assume the existence of a market-maker whose function is to adjust the price.
If the excess demand qx is positive (negative), the market maker raises (reduces)
the stock price for the next period. Precisely, the new price is calculated as the
previous price yt plus some fraction of the excess demand of the previous period
according: ∆yt+1 = λq
∑N
i=1 xit, where xit denotes the investment attitude of
trader i at period t, ∆yt+1 the price change from the current period to the next
period, i.e. ∆yt+1 = yt+1 − yt, and the parameter λ represents the speed of
adjustment of the market price. At the equilibrium prices that clear the market
there should exist an equal number of buyers or sellers, i.e.:
∑N
i=1 xit = 0. Using
the Boltzmann distribution (4) the mean value of the price changes ∆y¯ is given
by ∆y¯ =
∑N
k=1 P (x
k)q
∑N
i=1 x
k
i .
2.4 Mean-Field Approximation : Keynes’ Beauty Contest
We can derive analytically the stationary states of the traders’ investment at-
titude using a mean field approximation which is a well known technique in
statistical physics. Let us replace the discrete summation of the investment
attitude with the mean field variable, 〈x〉 = 〈(1/N)
∑N
i=1 xi〉. We addition-
ally assume that the parameter aij is equal to a aij = a and bi = b for
every trader. In this case our interacting-agent model reduces to the Ising
model with long-range interactions. Then the function (2) is approximated by
E(x) ≈ −(1/2)
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 aN〈x〉xi −
∑N
i=1 bsxi. Since the mean value of the
stationary distribution is given by 〈E(x)〉 = −∂ logZ/∂µ, the mean field 〈x〉 is
〈x〉 = tanh(µaN〈x〉+ µbs). (5)
The first term of the right side of Eq. (5) represents that traders tend to
adopt the same investment attitude as prediction of the average investment
attitude and the second term represents the influence of the change of investment
environment to traders’ investment attitude. The first term may be interpreted
as a mathematical formularisation of Keynes’ beauty contest. Keynes [1] argued
that stock prices are not only determined by the firm’s fundamental value, but in
addition mass psychology and investors expectations influence financial markets
significantly. It was his opinion that professional investors prefer to devote their
energies not to estimating fundamental values, but rather to analysing how
the crowd of investors is likely to behave in the future. As a result, he said,
most persons are largely concerned, not with making superior long-term forecasts
of the probable yield of an investment over its whole life, but with foreseeing
changes in the conventional basis of valuation a short time ahead of the general
public. Keynes used his famous beauty contest as a parable to stock markets. In
order to predict the winner of a beauty contest, objective beauty is not much
important, but knowledge or prediction of others’ predictions of beauty is much
more relevant. In Keynes view, the optimal strategy is not to pick those faces
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the player thinks prettiest, but those the other players are likely to be about
what the average opinion will be, or to proceed even further along this sequence.
2.5 Speculative Price Dynamics
We assume that the traders’ investment attitude changes simultaneously (syn-
chronous dynamics) in discrete time steps. We represent the dynamics of the
investment attitude using a straightforward iteration of Equation (5), such that:
〈x〉t+1 = tanh(α〈x〉t + βst), α = µaN, β = µb. (6)
We call α the bandwagon coefficient and β the investment environment coef-
ficient below because α may be interpreted as a parameter that denotes the
strength that traders chase the price trend. Next, let us approximate the ad-
justment process of the price using the mean field 〈x〉t. We can get the following
speculative price dynamics,
〈∆y〉t+1 = λN〈x〉t. (7)
Inserting the mean field of the price change, 〈∆y〉t into eq. 6, the dynamics of
the mean field of 〈x〉t can be rewritten as 〈x〉t+1 = tanh(
µa
λ
〈∆y〉t+1 + µbst).
This equation shows that the traders result in basing their trading decisions on
an analysis of the price trend 〈∆y〉t+1 as well as the change of the investment
environment st.
3 Speculative Bubbles and Crashes
The stationary states of the mean field 〈x〉 satisfy the following
〈x〉t = tanh(α〈x〉t + βs) ≡ f(〈x〉t, s). (8)
Eq. 8 has a unique solution 〈x〉 for arbitrary βs, when α is less than 1. The
stationary state 〈x〉∗ with βs = 0 is called as the fundamental equilibrium which
is stable and corresponds to the maximum of the stationary distribution of the
investment attitude P (x∗). In this stable equilibrium there is equal numbers of
traders sharing both investment attitudes on average.
Moving in the parameter space (α, β) and starting from different configura-
tions one have several possible scenarios of market-phase transitions. To begin
with, let us consider the case that the investment environment s is equal to zero.
In theory, when the bandwagon coefficient α is increased starting from the phase
at 0 < α < 1, there is a symmetry breaking at critical point, α = 1, and two
different market phases appear, that is, the bear market and the bull market.
In analogy to physical systems the transitions may be called the second-order
phase transition. Fig. 1 illustrates the two graphical solutions of the Eq. (8)
for α > 1 and s = 0 and for 0 < α < 1 and s = 0. The figure shows that for
0 < α < 1 and s = 0 the fundamental equilibrium is unique and stable, but for
α > 1 and s = 0 the fundamental equilibrium 0 becomes unstable, and the two
new equilibria, the bull market equilibrium a and the bear market equilibrium b
are stable. At the bull market equilibrium more than half number of traders is
buyer, so that the speculative bubbles occur in the stock market. Then, let us
consider the effect of changes of the investment environment s in the case with a
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weak bandwagon coefficient, 0 < α < 1 and a positive investment environment
coefficient, β > 0. Fig. 2 shows that as the investment environment s changes
for the better (s > 0), the system shifts to the bull market phase. By contrast,
as the investment environment s changes for the worse (s < 0), the system
shifts to the bear market phase. Therefore when the bandwagon effect is weak,
the stock price go up or down slowly according rises or falls in the investment
environment.
Finally, let us consider the effect of changes of βs in the case with a strong
bandwagon coefficient α > 1. In this case multistability and hysteresis phenom-
ena in the distribution of investment attitude, as well as market-phase transi-
tions are observed. The system has three equilibria, when α > 1 and |s| < s∗,
where s∗ is determined by the equation,
cosh2[βs±
√
α(α− 1)] = α. (9)
Two maximum of the stationary distribution on the investment attitude are
found at 〈x〉− and 〈x〉+ and one minimum at 〈x〉∗. For |s| = s∗ and α > 1, two
of the three equilibria coincide at
〈x〉c =
√
(α − 1)/α. (10)
For |s| > s∗ and α > 1 the two of three equilibria vanishes and only one
equilibrium remains. In analogy to physical systems the transitions may be
called first-order phase transitions. Fig. 3 illustrates the effect of changes in the
investment environment in the case with a strong bandwagon effect α > 1. In
this case speculative bubbles and market crashes occur. When the investment
environment changes for the better (worse), the curve that denotes f(〈x〉t, s),
shifts upward (downward). As the investment environment s keeps on rising, and
when it reach a critical value, that is, |s| = s∗, the bear market equilibrium and
the fundamental equilibrium vanish, and the bull market equilibrium becomes
an unique equilibrium of the system, so that the speculative bubble occurs in the
stock market. Even though the investment environment changes for the worse,
the hysteresis phenomena are observed in a range of the investment environment
that can be calculated by solving Eq. (9). In other words the speculative bubble
continues in a range of the investment environment. However when the negative
impact of the investment environment reaches a critical value, that is, |s| = s∗,
the bull market vanish. Further decrease of s cause the market-phase transition
from a bull market to a bear market. In a bear market more than half number
of trader is seller on average, so that the stock price continues to fall on average.
Thus this market phase transition may be considered as the stock market crash.
4 Empirical Analysis : Japan Crisis
Perhaps the most spectacular boom and bust of the late twentieth century
involved the Japan’s stock markets in 1987-1992. Stock prices increased from
1982 to 1989. At their peak in December 1989, Japanese stocks had a total
market value of about 4 trillion, almost 1.5 times the value of all U.S. equities
and close to 45 percent of the world’s equity market capitalisation. The fall
was almost as extreme as the U.S. stock-market crash from the end of 1929 to
mid-1932. The Japanese (Nikkei) stock-market index reached a high of almost
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40,000 yen in the end of 1989. By mid-August 1992, the index had declined to
14,309 yen, a drop of about 63 percent.
In this section we will estimate the parameter vector (α, β) for the Japan’s
stock market in 1987-1992. We use monthly adjusted data for the first difference
of Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX) and the investment environment over the
period 1988 to 1992. In order to get the mean value of the stock price changes,
TOPIX is adjusted through the use of a simple centred 12 point moving average,
and are normalised into the range of −1 to +1 by dividing by the maximum
value of the absolute value of the price changes. The normalised price change is
defined as 〈∆p〉t. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show the normalised stock price changes and
the investment environment respectively. This normalised stock price change
〈∆p〉t is used as a proxy of the mean field 〈x〉t. Inserting 〈∆p〉t for Eq. (8), we
get f(〈∆p〉t, st) = tanh(α〈∆p〉t + βst).
4.1 Model estimation: The gradient-descent algorithm
The bandwagon coefficient α and the investment environment coefficient β
should be estimated using any one of estimation technique. Since we cannot
get the analytical solution because the function f(〈∆p〉t, st) is non-linear, we
use the gradient-descent algorithm for the parameter estimation 4. The gradient-
descent algorithm is a stable and robust procedure for minimising the following
one-step-prediction error function
E(αk, βk) =
1
2
n∑
t=1
[〈∆p〉t − f(〈∆p〉t−1, st−1)]
2. (11)
More specifically, the gradient-descent algorithm changes the parameter vector
(αk, βk) to satisfy the following condition:
∆E(αk, βk) =
∂E(αk, βk)
∂αk
∆αk +
∂E(αk, βk)
∂βk
∆βk < 0, (12)
where ∆E(αk, βk) = E(αk, βk)−E(αk−1, βk−1), ∆αk = αk−αk−1, and ∆βk =
βk − βk−1. To accomplish this the gradient-descent algorithm adjusts each
parameter αk and βk by amounts ∆αk and ∆βk proportional to the negative of
the gradient of E(αk, βk) at the current location:
αk+1 = αk − η
∂E(αk, βk)
∂αk
, βk+1 = βk − η
∂E(αk, βk)
∂βk
(13)
where η is a learning rate. The gradient-descent rule necessarily decreases the
error with a small value of η. If the error function (11), thus, has a single
minimum at E(αk, βk) = 0, then the parameters (αk, βk) approaches the op-
timal values with enough iterations. The error function f(αk, βk), however, is
non-linear, and hence it is possible that the error function (11) may have local
minima besides the global minimum at E(αk, βk) = 0. In this case the gradient-
descent rule may become stuck at such a local minimum. To check convergence
of the gradient-descent method to the global minimum we estimate the param-
eters for a variety of alternative start up parameters (α0, β0) with η = 0.01.
4The gradient-descent method is often used for training multilayer feedforward networks.
It is called the back- propagation learning algorithm which is one of the most important
historical developments in neural networks [Rumelhart et al. [23].
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Period 〈∆p〉 Predicted value st
1989.09 0.4591 0.4487 0.0182
1989.10 0.4468 0.4361 0.0122
1989.11 0.4531 0.4408 0.011
1989.12 0.4369 0.4258 0.0075
1990.01 0.2272 0.2294 -0.002
1990.02 0.0985 0.0986 -0.0055
1990.03 -0.2013 -0.2097 -0.0099
1990.04 -0.2354 -0.2415 -0.0066
1990.05 -0.0845 -0.0871 -0.0004
1990.06 -0.0883 -0.0924 -0.0029
1990.07 -0.3136 -0.3159 -0.0067
1990.08 -0.5245 -0.4992 -0.0136
Table 1: The stock market crash in the Japanese stock market
As a consequence the gradient-descent rule estimated the same values of the
parameters, (α∗, β∗) = (1.04, 0.5) with enough iterations.
4.2 Results
The fit of the estimated equation can be seen graphically in Fig. (6), which
compare the actual and forecasted series over one period, respectively. The
correlation coefficient that indicates goodness of fit is 0.994. The capacity of
the model to forecast adequately in comparison with competing models is an
important element in the evaluation of its overall performance. Let us consider
the linear regression model 〈∆y〉t+1 = c〈∆y〉t + dst. The regression results are
〈∆p〉t+1 = 0.855〈∆p〉t + 3.81st. The correlation coefficient of the linear regres-
sion model is equal to 0.93, and is lower that that of the interacting-agent model.
Root mean squared errors (RMSEs) of the interacting-agent model is equal to
0.05, and that of the linear regression model is equal to 0.148 over the period
1987-1992. The interacting-agent model has a smaller RMSE than that of the
linear regression model. By the traditional RMSE criterion the interacting-
agent model is, thus, superior to the linear regression model in term of their
forecasting performance. In conclusion we can say that the model not only
explains the Japan crisis but also correctly forecasts changing the stock price
over the period 1987-1992. Given that the set of parameters (α, β) is equal to
(1.04, 0.5), the critical point of the investment environment at which the phase
transition are caused from the bull market to bear market are calculated from
the theoretical results in the preceding section. One can say that the phase
transition from the bull market to the bear market occurs when the investment
environment is below −0.007 under (α, β) = (1.04, 0.5). By contrast the phase
transition from the bear market to the bull market occurs when the investment
environment is beyond 0.007 under (α, β) = (1.04, 0.5). From theoretical view
point one may say that bursting speculative bubbles will begin when the invest-
ment environment is below −0.007, and the process of the collapse of the stock
market continues till the investment environment is beyond 0.007.
In the real world the investment environment became below −0.007 at March
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1990 for the first time and continued to be negative values since then over the
period 1987-1992. The fall of the actual price in the Japan’s stock market began
at March 1990, and the stock prices continued to fall over the period 1990-1992.
On these grounds we have come to the conclusion that theory and practice are
in a perfect harmony. (See Table 1.)
5 Conclusion
This paper presents an interacting-agentmodel of speculative activity explaining
the bubbles and crashes in stock markets in terms of a mean field approximation.
We show theoretically that these phenomena are easy to understand as the
market- phase transitions. Bubbles and crashes are corresponding to the second-
order transitions and the first-order transitions respectively. Furthermore we
estimate the parameters of the model for the Japanese stock market in 1987-
1992. The empirical results demonstrate that theory and practice are in a
perfect harmony. This fact justifies our model that bubbles and crashes have
their origin in the collective crowd behaviour of many interacting agents.
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7 Figure Captions
Figure 1. The second-order phase transition. Numerical solution of Eq.(8) for
s = 0. The curve is the RHS of 8 plotted for different values of α: the AA line
- α = 0.9, the BB line - α = 2.
Figure 2. Numerical solution of Eq.(8) for α = 0.8 and β = 1. f(〈x〉t, s) is
the RHS of (8) plotted for different values of α: the AA line - s = 0.3, the BB
line - s = −0.3.
Figure 3. The first-order transition: Speculative bubble and crash. Numer-
ical solution of Eq. (8) for α = 1.8 and β = 1. The curves is f(〈x〉t, s) plotted
for different values of the investment environment: the AA line - s = 0.41, the
BB line - s = −0.41.
Figure 4. The adjusted stock price change, 〈∆p〉: January 1987 - December
1992.
Figure 5. The Japan’s investment environment st: January 1987 - December
1992.
Figure 6. One-step-forecast of the stock price changes: January 1987 - De-
cember 1992.
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